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ABSTRACT: This article aims to explore the expansion of power of monocratic figures during the Covid-19 
crisis. In particular, it compares the Italian and Spanish cases, at both national and sub-national levels, 
during the pandemic. First, we explore the dynamics of personalization through an empirical analysis of 
emergency decrees at the state level. Second, we examine personalization as evidence of centre-periphery 
conflict by taking into consideration regional rules (decrees, orders, regulations, resolutions) and their 
relation to the state level. The comparison shows a similar path of institutional personalization of politics in 
Italy and Spain, with both countries displaying the features of an unstable regional framework. 
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The Covid-19 pandemic is a “good” example of a transboundary crisis (Boin 2009). Each crisis requires 
coordination skills which, if not well orchestrated, result in a power vacuum or, conversely, a concentration of 
power. Indeed, the need for rapid intervention in unpredictable situations often strengthens monocratic actors. 
Contemporary democracies have experienced states of exception and the transitory suspension of general rules 
which, together with restrictions on the constitutional freedoms of citizens, have resulted in endowing 
governments with extraordinary competences as regards legislative functions (Norris 2008, Shugart 2008). In 
such exceptional situations, it is expected that path dependency is at work and that pre-existing tendencies of 
personalization are deepened. Did Covid-19 work as an accelerator of an underlying presidentialization 
dynamic? 
To address this question, the article investigates the Italian and Spanish Prime Ministers’ rule-making in the 
very first phases of the pandemic. Moreover, it takes into consideration the legislative initiatives and 
procedures adopted by Italian and Spanish Regional Presidents. Italy and Spain are two of the countries in the 
European region most affected by Covid-19. Drawing from Poguntke and Webb’s seminal work, both Italy 
and Spain display trends of presidentialized government, at both national and regional levels. So, this paper 
will explore if and how, at this critical moment, both countries are experimenting with an analogue political 
trend that can shed light on the future perspective of government. As a matter of fact, the economic, social and 
even political similarities between Italy and Spain have often produced fruitful comparisons (Lijphart, 
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Bruneau, Diamandouros, Gunther 1988; Hopkin, Mastropaolo 2001). Especially in this case, the comparison 
is very relevant because both countries have a parliamentary system and a coalition government, but Italy – 
unlike Spain – is as an anomaly in the European panorama because it does not provide for any derogatory 
regime in cases of emergency (Musella 2020a, 2020b).  
More specifically, the article proceeds as follows. In the first section, we refer to the theoretical framework 
bridging the literature on presidentialization and that on crisis management. Indeed, although scholars have 
been pointing out presidentialization processes in parliamentary regimes for years (Poguntke and Webb 2005; 
Musella and Webb 2015), the extraordinary situation due to the pandemic crisis seems to have emphasized 
this trend. In the third and fourth sections, after clarifying the different conceptions of a “state of exception” 
in the Italian and Spanish constitutional traditions, we first explore, at the state level, the primacy of the Chief 
Executive, measuring the growth of Presidents’ powers via an empirical analysis of emergency decrees in the 
first phases of the crisis. Indeed, during the pandemic crisis, Chief Executives have dominated national 
decision-making, especially through the use of executive decrees as ordinary instruments of government 
(Musella 2018, 2019). Furthermore, we examine personalization as evidence of centre-periphery conflict, 
taking into consideration regional normative production (decrees, orders, regulations, resolutions) and its 
relation to the state level (Rahat and Sheafer 2007; Balmas, Rahat, Sheafer and Shenhav 2014). Indeed, the 
architecture of regionalism in both countries establishes a dynamic of presidentialization not only at the state 
level, but also at the regional one. Therefore, the separation of powers, provided for by constitutions, enters a 
state crisis even more prominently due to the pandemic. Yet, especially in those countries featuring difficult 
‘territorial management’ (Keating 1988), the emergency phase has also reinforced the power of Regional 
Presidents, thus paving the way for a spiral of centre-periphery conflicts. Indeed, although the literature argues 
that an effective response to the crisis mainly depends on coordination and collaboration between various 
public institutions and powers (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius 2005), the ongoing pandemic crisis shows 
an almost opposite trend. In the last section, the findings of the analysis are discussed and compared, thanks 
to the theoretical background that we present in the following section.  
Thanks to the reconstruction of the first pandemic phase, the article shows the role of crisis management in 
accelerating multi-level personal politics. Indeed, the analysis confirms that presidentialization represents an 
empirically relevant phenomenon in contemporary politics that affects several levels of government. More 
precisely, we find that the pandemic represents a contingent factor that contributes to a shift towards more 
presidentialized governance, i.e. a political situation that centralizes power in the hands of the Chief Executive 
at the expense of the legislature and the principle of collegiality. However, we also highlight the role of parties 
in government, since the coalition governments that have been established, more in Spain than in Italy, have 
been able to partially curtail the dominant role of Prime Ministers. Finally, the article shows that the crucial 
role of leadership affects crisis management from a territorial point of view, bringing out a dynamic of 
personalization at the sub-national level, too ('t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993).  
 
 
2. Theoretical framework: the personalization of politics 
 
The state of emergency caused by the spread of Covid-19 has led to extraordinary measures that are part of 
the exceptional nature of historical contingencies, resulting in a transfer of power towards a governmental pole 
that acts as an interpreter of emergency clauses. This process takes place in the contemporary phase that politics 
is experiencing, characterized by the clear difficulties of the representative circuit based on political parties 
which, until a few decades ago, were the main axis of state-building. Legislative production is an immediate 
indicator of a power shift from the parliamentary body to the executive and its vertex (Pérez Francesch 2020) 
1. The growth of acts emanating from executive and prime ministers implies a change in the executive-
 
1 In recent years this trend, also associated with the tactical use of the question of trust, has been a means of securing a 
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parliament relationship at the expense of the legislative body. A pandemic, as a state of exception, is a 
significant occasion to observe evidence of this trend. During times of crisis, citizens look at their leaders, 
demanding a response to solve the crisis that can at the same time be “robust and flexible” (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern 
and Sundelius 2005).  
In this line of thinking, we understand the presidentialization of politics as the institutional face of the 
phenomenon of personalization (Balmas, Rahat, Sheafer, and Shenhav 2014). Therefore, although 
personalization and presisentialization are not interchangeable concepts, they are clearly connected (Elgie and 
Passarelli 2019, Picarella 2009). Moreover, we consider personalization as a dynamic of the connection 
between citizenship and politicians in a plebiscitarian way (Linz 1990). As a matter of fact, personalization 
makes politics more focused on individual people and their personal characteristics. In this sense, 
personalization is a key concept that defines the relation between the people and institutions, ensuring a 
(re)new(ed) channel of identification in which personal linkage is a fundamental and structural factor. Indeed, 
democratic regimes are strongly influenced by the charismatic appeal of single leaders, portraying a populist 
hypothesis of a society formed on one side by the people, part of the political community, i.e. the civil society, 
the electorate; and on the other side, by representatives and the elite that occupy the institutions. In this context, 
a single leader arises as a representative of the general will, assuming a crucial role (Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2017; Viviani 2017). 
The executive arena is the main space in which the process of personalization takes place, both formally 
and informally. Constitutional provisions are clearly important in determining the evolution of the political 
system (Samuels and Shugart 2010), but scholars have also highlighted the presidentialization of the executive 
without any constitutional modifications (Poguntke and Webb 2005). Institutions have become more 
individualised than in the past (Karvonen 2010), and this process is principally due to the growth in autonomy 
of the Chief Executive (Poguntke and Webb 2005), in both formal powers and political praxis. A necessary 
precondition for this is a strong transformation of the Executive, both normatively and organizationally (Calise 
2005). Normative growth is reflected in the expansion of legislative power of the Government (law-decrees, 
presidential decrees or delegated legislation), and thus in the executive’s influence on the legislative agenda. 
Indeed, in recent decades, we have witnessed a strengthening of the executive's powers and an overall 
weakening of the parliamentary functions of control and guidance (Pastore 2020). Organizational increases 
are, instead, evident in the concentration of resources (and power) in the support structures and office of the 
President. This is partly due to structural tendencies such as the internationalization of politics and governance, 
which make the Executive more independent of Parliament, and the extensive use of expert committees to 
manage crisis situations (Poguntke 2005, Criscitiello 2019). 
In line with institutional and executive presidentialization, there is also party change. It is in this scenario 
that the concept of “personal parties” (Calise 2000, 2016; Passarelli 2015; Rahat, Kenig 2018) has been 
proposed. To date, scholars have analysed the presidentialization of parties as a sub-dimension of the general 
process of the presidentialization of politics (Samuels and Shugart 2010; Passarelli 2015; Webb, Poguntke, 
Kolodny 2012). Such structural factors as the economic crisis and loss of the representativeness and legitimacy 
of political collective actors increase the trust placed in a single leader inside the organization. When the party 
leader is also the leader of the parliamentary group and the Chief Executive, power is concentrated at the top 
(Musella 2018). Thus, the leader becomes essential to bring electoral stability to the party, developing an 
almost intimate linkage with the electorate, often changing the internal organizational structure of the party, 
e.g. with open methods for leader selection (Sandri, Seddone and Venturino 2015). The relationship between 
political parties and citizens is strongly influenced by the leader’s success, based on some material resources 
but especially on his/her charismatic authority, as the seminal work of Cavalli showed some decades ago 
(Cavalli 1981). This creates a plebiscitarian linkage rather than one based on ideological belonging. More 
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either or both by attracting the voters’ support. In the hand-to-hand battle between leader and party, the 
hegemony of one necessarily weakens the other. When this battle is at the government level, it involves the 
party system as a whole. We can imagine a moment in which the success of the party occurs at the expense of 
the leader; then, there is a space in which a relatively small growth in the weight of the leader corresponds to 
a relatively small loss of weight of the party, and vice versa, and finally a point of balance where both party 
and leader reach the maximum level of success and political legitimacy, one thanks to the other.  
The representation process through which political parties, fully personalized, achieve electoral success and 
institutions makes clear the coexistence of two political actors: the party and the leader, notably modify partisan 
alignment in a general frame of personal politics (Musella 2014). Indeed, despite the central role of the leader, 
the party is still an important electoral machine to influence political institutions (Calise 2000; Dalton and 
Wattenberg 2000). This is especially true in a multi-party system in which political fragmentation does not 
allow the formation of a majority able to form a single-party government, so that coalition governments are 
most likely to emerge. Coalition formation theories have stressed that parties are generally oriented through, 
at a minimum, winning a coalition (Riker 1962; Muller and Strom 2000), and that the coalition rationale 
implies bargaining for both policy-seeking parties and office-seeking ones (Axelrod 1970). Therefore, 
compromise is a key feature of a coalition government. Consequently, a Prime Minister leading a coalition 
government should not be as powerful and dominant as one leading a single-party government. In this sense, 
personalization defines a new power structure inside parties and among them, inside a political system in which 
the leader plays a pivotal role (Musella and Webb 2015). In this sense, if different regime types provide 
different settings for political actors and resources that settle various types of leadership (Passarelli 2015), 
likewise, different coalition governments can delineate various degrees of presidential power. 
The role of leaders is also crucial at the regional level (Sotarauta, Beer and Gibney 2017). Indeed, even if 
political parties, which are state-wide with regional branches, engage in centre-periphery conflict, the 
emergence and increasing centrality of a personal leader weakens the role of collective intermediate bodies 
(Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000; Samuels and Shugart 2010). In this sense, a more presidentialized 
system is a less party-oriented one, in which conflict between the centre and the periphery of the political 
system is also no longer party-oriented. Moreover, processes such as the deterritorialization and globalization 
of politics and the economy act as a counterbalance to the new protagonism of basic administrative units of 
the State (Keating 1997, 1998). Especially in countries where the sub-national level is an important constituent 
element of the political system, the regions represent decentralized decision-making arenas and are key actors 
in centre-periphery conflicts (Hopkin and van Houten 2009). Indeed, although some scholars (Dayton, Boin, 
Mitroff, Alpaslan, Green, Kouzmin, Jarman 2004) argue that crisis experience tends to foster decision-making 
decentralization in crisis management, this coordination rarely occurs in practice without any overlap or 
contradiction (Clementi 2020). According to the crisis management literature (’t Hart, Rosenthal, and Kouzmin 
1993), in a time of crisis, coordination between various actors and level of authority is a main challenge in 
multilevel decision-making contexts (Pallarés and Keating 2003; Wilson 2012). From this perspective, the 
Covid-19 pandemic provides a “stress test” or a “window of opportunity” for the crisis management capacity 
of leadership and political systems as a whole (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, Sundelius 2005). 
 
 
3. The Italian case 
 
Italy and its Prime Ministers represent a crucial case of the presidenzialization of politics in a parliamentary 
system (Venturino 2001; Calise 2005). Starting with Silvio Berlusconi in the nineties, political leaders have 
developed a direct relationship with the electorate without any formal change to the constitutional charter 
(Campus 2016; Fabbrini 2013). Since then, the main indicators of legislative activities have shown an evident 
shift in power from parliamentary to the executive, with significant growth in the number of decree-laws as a 
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provides the Government with the possibility to issue normative acts having the force of law and a temporary 
nature in extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency (decreti legge; d.l.). Such decrees come into force 
immediately after their publication in the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic, but they lose their 
effectiveness if Parliament does not enact them into law within 60 days of publication. Moreover, Law 
400/1988 (art.17) specifies the regulatory power of the Prime Minister, who also started issuing autonomous 
decrees (decreti del Presidente del Consiglio dei ministry; dPCm) with increasing frequency and political 
impact, relying on acts not directly foreseen by the Italian Constitution. This type of legislation progressively 
expanded until the contemporary emergency phase, setting aside the principle of collegiality in order to 
facilitate more rapid governmental action and response to extraordinary situations. Furthermore, the Prime 
Minister’s decrees are not subject to political control by Parliament and the President of the Republic and, as 
administrative acts, they are not subject to control by the Council of State (Tarli Barbieri 2019), thus 
constituting an important and discreet autonomous field of action for a monocratic actor. 
During the Covid-19 crisis, dPCms represent the principal channel that allows Giuseppe Conte to cope with 
the virus in Italy in a speedy and independent way. Indeed, after Italy joined the list of affected countries at the 
end of January, a decree-law2 approved by the executive attributed to the chief executive ample emergency 
powers, thus opening room for a conspicuous number of dPCms. So, presidential decrees became – in both 
frequency and extent – the main emergency intervention tools. This type of act shows its distance from the 
provisions of the Constitutional Charter regarding the decree of necessity and urgency, thus tarnishing the 
collegiality principle vis-à-vis both the Executive and Parliament (Clementi 2020).  
Furthermore, considering that a state of exception is not foreseen by the Italian Constitution, in 1992, Law 
n. 225 established the national civil protection service and rules in a state of emergency (Staiano 2020). This 
was deliberated by the Council of Ministers, along with the Prime Minister’s proposal, and so one can be 
declared in the event of a natural disaster or human activities that need immediate intervention and 
extraordinary powers3. The Law establishes that, during an emergency, the Head of the Civil Protection 
Department holds the power of ordinance, unless otherwise established via a resolution in a state of emergency. 
Because of Covid-19, the Council of Ministers debated a state of emergency on 31 January. 
Italy had to face a rapid escalation in infections: with the decree-law of 23 February, "Urgent measures for 
the containment and management of the epidemiological emergency from COVID 19" and the consequent 
dPCm of February 23 “Implementing the provisions of the decree-law of 23 February”, emergency command 
was centralized in the hands of the Prime Minister, and full marginalization of the ordinary legislative process 
and restrictions on mobility to eleven municipalities, ten of these in the Lombardy region and one in the Veneto 
region, were imposed. Only two weeks later, Conte was obliged to extend these measures to several Italian 
regions, from Lombardy to Veneto and Emilia Romagna. Since 4 March, schools and universities have been 
closed nationally, and on 8 March Italy opted for a national quarantine, with people ordered to stay at home 
and allowed to go out only for essential and self-certified reasons. These measures were followed a few days 
later by a general shutdown of the Italian production system. From February 23rd onwards, the various dPCms 
issued by the Italian Prime Minister affected the very delicate sphere of citizen’s rights, from freedom of 
movement to economic enterprise, with relevant short- and long-term consequences. 
Constitutional scholars stress that the use of Prime Ministerial Decrees, although they allow the government 
to deal quickly with an emergency, represents a way of escaping the parliamentary dialectic, neither fostering 
nor allowing collaboration of majority and parliamentary minorities. Indeed, despite Parliament having not 
stopped its work, examining, modifying and converting about ten decree-laws during the first months of the 
emergency (Pastore 2020), the widespread use of dPCms, especially to regulate matters subject to legal reserve, 
is noticeable and growing (Musella 2020a; Rullo 2021).  
 
2 Here we refer to Decreto-legge 23 febbraio 2020, “Misure urgenti in materia di contenimento e gestione dell’emergenza 
epidemiologica da COVID 19”. 








Figure 1 - Number of dPCms (per annum) adopted in 2000–2020. 
 
Source: https://www.normattiva.it/. Author’s own elaboration. 
 
As has been observed, the overall "regulatory role" of Government has grown, making the Government the 
"signore delle fonti" (Cartabia 2011). This trend is very evident in Figure 1, in which is reported the use of 
dPCms by the Italian Presidente del Consiglio in the last 20 years. The use of these acts is clear evidence of 
the growth of the president's power. Moreover, scholars observe that Covid-19 challenges legislatures in terms 
of playing a guide role (Ginsburg 2020). As Bar-Siman-Tov (2020) argues: “the Coronavirus pandemic poses 
a dual challenge for legislatures: the pandemic makes it difficult and even dangerous for legislators to operate 
according to regular order in their elected assemblies; and it creates a sense of emergency that empowers the 
executive branch and emboldens its motivations to assert greater authority at the expense of the legislature”. 
In Italy, the Parliament continued its work in the presence of the pandemic, creating the conditions for 
distancing between deputies and senators and sometimes allowing a roll call to reduce the number of people 
present in the hall. But, at the same time, it was decided to focus parliamentary activities only on urgent and 
undelayable acts, such as the conversion of "pandemic" decree-laws (Ibrido 2020). 
As the typology of acts in Figure 2 shows, in the first and second phases of the emergency (from the end of 
February to May 2020), decision-making was highly centralized at the executive level. In fact, the actors who 
legislated were all in the Government: the numbers of presidential decrees and law-decrees are almost the 
same, while orders from the Head of Department of Civil Protection are more numerous. The pandemic crisis 
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Source: Conferenza delle Regioni e delle Province Autonome. Author’s own elaboration. 
 
If, from a legislative point of view, in these first two phases, the Prime Minister and the executive body 
produced about the same numbers of acts, mediatically speaking, the Prime Minister was predominant. As `t 
Hart, Heyse and Boin (2001, 183) offer in evidence with respect to crisis management, “it is not just running 
the physical response operation that counts, managing the `image fallout' that follows the outbreak of crisis 
has become important as well”. As a matter of fact, during the crisis, Giuseppe Conte often spoke to the nation 
through press conferences on national television (where the Prime Minister generally speaks in the first 
person), or directly through his personal Facebook page (Karlsen and Enjolras 2016). While a few years ago 
one may have imagined that the Prime Minister would act and make pronouncements after intense discussions 
with party representatives, Conte seemed to offer personal guidance during the crisis, with only the support of 
an inner cycle of scientific experts collected in committees4 (Calise and Musella 2019). Conte’s media presence 
stands for the institutional centralization of power in his hands5.  
The coalition government in charge, which has to cope with the pandemic, is composed of the Five Star 
Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle, M5S), the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD), Italy alive 
(Italia Viva, IV) and Free and Equal (Liberi e Uguali, LeU) 6, while the Presidente del Consiglio, Giuseppe 
Conte, is an Independent and not formally a member of any party. Whereas M5S and PD hold most of the 
ministerial offices, IV and LeU have very few, yet these are strategic for pandemic management; they hold 
 
4 This represents the conditions for a quite obscure decision-making process, as observed by B. Caravita, 
“L’Italia ai tempi del coronavirus: rileggendo la Costituzione italiana”, in federalismi.it, 18 marzo 2020. 
5 As observed by Rullo (2021): “In the first instance, his followers increased from almost one million in January 2020 to over 
three million at the beginning of May, while he reached almost 700,000 followers on Twitter.” 
6 LeU was launched in 2017 as a federation of political parties including Article 1 (Articolo 1), Italian Left (Sinistra Italiana) 
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LeU, the Health Ministry, IV, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Policies, and the Ministry of Equal 
Opportunities and Family. Nevertheless, the coalition supporting the Conte II government appears divided on 
both minor and major issues such as electoral law (Lupo 2020). Moreover, lacking any constitutional provision 
for a state of emergency and the President being a person formally independent of the parties in government, 
the centralization of powers was essentially automatic. Indeed, despite having to deal with a coalition 
government and power-sharing by several parties, in Italy the Presidente del Consiglio was the central actor in 
management of the pandemic. 
The only ones who seem to impinge on the Prime Minister’s power are the Presidents of the Regions, at 
both the media and decision-making levels. With the constitutional reform in 1999, these monocratic actors 
have become the highest political authority provided with direct legitimation in Italy. Furthermore, the 
personalization of politics helps this monocratization. The reform of Title V of the Constitution (2001) 
relaunched Italian regionalism on a new basis. In fact, the criterion of competences division between the centre 
and intermediate bodies was reversed, according to a policy that made the regions holders of general legislative 
power. The “governors”, as Regional Presidents are often referred to, to evoke their American namesakes, 
already at the centre of the media scene, also became the centre of a reform that revised the nature of the State. 
During the Covid-19 emergency, the Regional Presidents very often integrated, reinforced or challenged the 
Prime Minister’s decisions and power, through the use of a number of relevant emergency orders7. However, 
the crucial role of the Presidents of the Regions is evident, above all in the mediatic arena in which they can 
establish direct and immediate links with citizens. Indeed, “one of the most crucial leadership tasks during a 
crisis is to explain what is happening and what leaders are doing to manage the crisis” (Boin 2009, 373). For 
instance, the President of Region Campania, Vincenzo De Luca, attracted the attention of international media 
thanks to his vigorous opposition to the spread of the epidemic contagion in his territory. Besides, after some 
days, the Ambassador of the United States, comparing Giuseppe Conte and Donald Trump, declared his trust 
in both, describing them as strong leaders able to face up to the emergency.  
The great number of ordinances, as shown in Figure 3, has led to the government, in the absence of adequate 
coordination procedures between the State and the Regions, creating tools of "standardization", as in the case 
of the preparation of the draft ordinance model of Health Minister Speranza. The management of the 
emergency has given rise to disputes over competences (Catelani 2020), if not real political conflict, as in the 
case of Marche Region, where the Regional President, Luca Ceriscioli, decided to close the schools and ban 
public events before the Prime Minister’s decision8. The mechanism for coordination in two-level governance 
contemplated in Law-Decree 6/2020 does not work well; for example, the decisions taken by the President of 
the Calabria Region, Jole Santelli, challenged the Conte government by reopening bars and restaurants when 
the national territory was still experiencing the so-called phase 1 of the emergency, with an order contested in 
front of the TAR9. Moreover, this is evocative of the conflict between Central Government and the Lombardy 
Region as regards the possibilty to declare “red zones”10 or not. Nevertheless, conflicts occur not only between 
the Regions and the State but also between the Regions themselves, as shown in the case of the President of 
Basilicata region, Vito Bardi, who, fearing that Lucanian migrant workers and students might return to their 
region, appealed to Conte and the Interior Minister, Lamorgese, in respect of the order of the President of the 
Lombardy region that halted productive activities11. 
 
7 Art. 32 of the law of 23 December 1978, n. 833 allows a Regional President, in matters of hygiene and public health, to 
adopt contingent and urgent ordinances with their effect extended to the Region or part of its territory. 
8 See, among others, the article “Coronavirus, scuolechiuse” (by Monica Rubino), published in La Repubblica newspaper: 
https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/02/26/news/coronavirus_scontro_stato-regioni_ceriscioli_marche-249607131/ 
9 See the following article, published in La Repubblica, “Coronavirus, il Tar accoglie il ricorso del Governo contro l'ordinanza 
della Calabria” (by Alessia Candito): 
https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/05/09/news/tar_accoglie_ricorso_governo_su_ordinanza_calabria-256157510/ 
10 See the article“Conte-Fontana: si riaccendo il conflitto tra Stato e Regioni”(by Annamaria Graziano), published in the 
Italian Times: https://www.theitaliantimes.it/politica/conte-fontana-conflitto-stato-regioni_150620/ 
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Figure 3 - Number of acts adopted by single autonomous communities during the period March–May 2020 (1st and 
2nd phases of Covid-19). 
 
Source: Conferenza delle Regioni e delle Province Autonome. Author’s own elaboration. 
 
As the notable normative production demonstrates, the regional level of governance competed with that of 
the state in terms of quantity and primacy. In the Italian legal system, the Regions are responsible for health 
protection, while the State determines the fundamental principles. So, constitutional provisions (art. 117 Cost.) 
and the vertical subsidiarity principle encourage concrete actions of the Regions in the health sector, while the 
state of emergency pushes for a more centralized decision-making system. The result is “normative 
hyperactivism” (Catelani 2020) and a confusing scenario in which the only certainty is the crucial role of the 
personal leader, at both state and regional levels. 
 
 
4. The Spanish case  
 
The first Covid-19 case was registered in one of the Canary Islands on 31 January, while the first death was 
in Valencia on 13 February. Currently, Spain is the country the third most affected by the Coronavirus 
pandemic in the European Region.12 In the first ten days of March, some Autonomous Communities began to 
take measures to combat the virus until the Central Government declared a state of emergency, initially for 
two weeks, on 14 March in Real Decreto 463/202013. 
Unlike the Italian case, in Spain, there is a formal constitutional provision for a state of alarm, exception 
and siege14 (art. 116 of Constitution and Ley Orgánica 4/1981) that allows the Government to deal with an 
emergency. In addition, Organic Law 4/1981 also provides that a decree declaring a state of alarm may impose 
 
12 Website consulted on 11 June 2020: http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-
19/covid-19-latest-updates 
13 As the brief note of the Italian Senate, N. 180 – March 2020, states, some parliamentary groups presented motions to be voted 
on in the second extension to the state of alarm. The resolution approved by the Congress of Deputies is that of the PNV which 
obliges the Government to inform Parliament weekly on the emergency measures adopted. In our view, this stresses the role of 
political parties in limiting executive overpower. 
14 According to the doctrine, the alarm status is the most ambiguous and soft among the states of emergency and perhaps, at this 
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limits on the movement or permanence of people15. Based on such provisions, Decree 463/2020 imposes a 
limitation on citizens’ freedom of movement and “social distancing” measures.  
Meanwhile, four days before the declaration of a state of alarm, the Congress of Deputies and the Senate 
suspended its parliamentary activity due to contagion among the Vox and Podemos deputies,16 prompting a 
few days later the inauguration of an online voting method and curtailing the schedule of parliamentary work 
(Piergigli 2020). The Congress of Deputy granted six extensions (7 March, 10 April, 24 April, 8 May, 22 May 
and finally 3 June: the last two fall outside our temporal framework) to the state of alarm, and the Council of 
Ministers, on 28 April, approved a De-escalation Plan (Plan de desescalada)17 which contained measures for 
a transition towards a “nueva normalidad” (new normality). 
The Plan consists of four phases, each lasting at least two weeks18, depending on the epidemiological state 
of each region and depicting asymmetrical governance. The Plan is especially relevant in this sense because it 
identifies collaboration between the State and Autonomous Communities as a principle of escalation, but the 
last word on transition from one phase to another comes from central government and is based on various 
indicators.  
However, focusing on the first two phases (from March to May 2020), we notice that the initial management 
of the crisis showed a centralising character, also because Spain is the only other European system, apart from 
the Italian one, to contemplate emergency decrees, i.e. decree-laws, decretos-leyes (Astarloa Huarte-Mendicoa 
1985; Tarchi and Fiumicelli 2016). This is one of the main reasons why executive powers have been growing 
thanks to the use of legislative power that is – for the Government – constitutionally limited to some special 
situations of urgency and extraordinary circumstances (art. 86). Notwithstanding, the need for normative 
intervention by the central government has been extensive. So, the use of decree-laws has been very frequent, 
while the law will gradually lose ground, because law-decrees are the best-equipped regulatory instrument to 
respond to social demands in critical situations, such as an economic or health crisis. The use of decree-laws 
as ordinary legislation practice has been a constant in the Spanish constitutional democracy, although it 
recently reached a high level, especially if compared with ordinary legislation (Aragón Reyes 2016; Barreiro 
González 2003; Carmona Contreras 2013; Celotto 1999; Pérez Sola 2020). Moreover, according to Law 
50/1997, both the President and Ministers have regulatory powers with reales decretos19, and Ministers can 
also issue resolutions and provisions via ministerial orders. But, unlike Italy, the use of autonomous decrees 




15 Other measures provided for by Article 11, II Chapter of the Organic Law 4/1981 are: requisitions of goods; temporary 
occupation of factories or industries and exploitation of natural resources; limits on basic necessities; provisions for market 
supply. 
16 See these journal articles (12 March): https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2020/03/10/5e677680fdddff77138b45be.html; 
https://elpais.com/espana/2020-03-12/el-congreso-aplaza-las-explicaciones-del-ministro-de-sanidad-tras-el-positivo-de-la-
ministra-montero-por-coronavirus.html. 
17 To see the conference: https://www.marca.com/tiramillas/actualidad/2020/04/28/5ea84bf122601d43128b459b.html. 
See also the Moncloa official website: https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/Paginas/enlaces/280420-enlace-
desescalada.aspx. 
18 Here is a guide to find out what stage each Autonomous Community is in: 
https://elpais.com/sociedad/2020/05/07/actualidad/1588852756_386639.html. 
19 For the analysis carried out here, we take into consideration Decrees issued by the Ministry of the Presidency since this is 
the Minister who directly supports the President. According to jurisprudence and doctrine, instead, Presidential decrees are 
generally used to manage the internal organization and structure of the Government. So, we decided not to take this type of act 
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Figure 4 - Presidential decrees and Ministry of the Presidency in Relation to Courts and Democratic Memory adopted in 
2000–2020. 
 
Source: https://www.boe.es/. Author’s own elaboration. 
 
Moreover, although Spain has opted for the use of remote voting, making the country one of those that have 
at least one “hybrid parliament” (Ibrido 2020), the role of the legislative body has not been more relevant than 
in Italy. Indeed, during the first emergency period, Parliament only approved law-decrees adopted by the 
executive and resolutions to extend the state of emergency20. As a matter of fact, gobernar por decreto seems 
to be a consolidated praxis adopted by governments of various political backgrounds (de la Iglesia 1997; 
Fittipaldi 2020). So, it comes as no surprise that the Covid-19 crisis has been managed through executive acts. 
Indeed, as Figure 2 shows, there are three types of acts: 1) 14 decree-laws21 (Reales Decretros-leyes); 2) six 
decrees proposed by the Ministry of the Presidency, Relations with the Courts and Democratic Memory; 3) 53 
ministerial resolutions, orders and dispositions (ordenes, resoluciónes) emanating from ministries.  
As Figure 5 shows, most statal acts are ministerial. Although the protagonism of the President is evident in 
the decrees proposed by the Ministry of the Presidency, Relations with the Courts and Democratic Memory 
(the ministry supporting the Presidency), these are significantly fewer than the acts (orders and resolutions) 
specified by various Ministers. This is mainly due to two factors. First, a constitutional provision establishes 
that the Government is the competent authority during a state of alarm (Article 7, Organic Law 4/1981), and 
its collegial body (Council of Ministers) has responsibility for declaring it (Article 4, Organic Law 4/1981 and 
Article 116, Constitution). 
Moreover, Decree 463/2020 (article 4) states that the competent delegated authorities, within their functions 
and under the direction of the President of the Government, will be four Ministers, namely the Minister of 
Defence, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Transport, Mobility and Public Agenda and the Minister 
of Healthcare (the latter is also competent in matters not delegated to other authorities). 
  
 
20 https://www.congreso.es/web/guest/iniciativas-legislativas-aprobadas?last_search=1.  











































































































age=/wc/busquedasLeyesAprobadas&anoLey=2020&selectLey=tituloListadoRealesDecretos. Author’s own elaboration. 
 
Second, looking at the Spanish party system and coalition government, the role of political parties limits the 
concentration of power in the hands of the President, since he must compete for power with other political and 
collective actors of the democratic regime, namely, political parties in both the Executive and Parliament22 
(Pomed Sànchez 2020; Salvador Crespo 2020). Indeed, the coalition government is composed of the Spanish 
Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE), United we can (Unidas Podemos, UP) 
and the Socialist Party of Catalonia (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya, PSC). The PSOE holds the major 
offices in the executive, while Podemos and IU hold a total of four ministries (namely the Ministry of Equality, 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Economy, the Ministry of Consumption and the Ministry of Social Policies 
and Agenda 203023). This Government framework paints a more favourable picture of the parties, not only 
because the Premier is also the leader of the major ruling party, but also because the constitutional provision 
for a state of emergency (in this case, the estado de alarma) provides for ministerial management of the crisis. 
Notwithstanding, if management of the crisis depicts rich ministerial normative production, the role of the 
President is predominant in the media arena, in which the personalization of politics is the main channel. 
President Pedro Sánchez holds many press conferences in Moncloa Palace and his activity is constant even on 
social media, so much so that the mediatic presence of Sánchez became a habit for Spanish people, as the 
document Comunicación política en tiempos de coronavirus highlights (AA.VV. 2020).  
However, in addition to the parties being competitors at the central level, the Spanish President also sees his 
power restricted by dominant figures at the regional level, being constitutionally provided for by administrative 
decentralization and a system of local autonomy. The Presidents of Autonomous Communities, in a regional 
party politics view, challenge the predominance of the Prime Minister in both the mediatic arena and legislative 
 
22 See, for example, the article published in El confidencial, “Los partidos limitan el margen y el poder de Sánchez en el estado 
de alarma”, by Fernando Garea: https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2020-04-10/partidos-limitan-margen-poder-sanchez-
estado-alarma-coronavirus_2542628/ 
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production, with autonomous decree-laws or other types of regulations, since the statutory reform, carried out 
since 2006, also incorporated and implemented the decree-law instrument at the regional level of governance 
(Pérez Sola 2020; Ruiz Rico Ruiz 2006)24. 
So, while a process of centralization of decision-making is evident at the central level, with the 
reinforcement of the role of the Executive, the protagonism of Regional Presidents must also be considered. 
As Stern and Sundelius (2002, 72) offer in evidence, crisis contingencies “pose similar challenges of decision-
making and communication to those who act in the name of the state. Actors at various levels of national and 
regional administration are likely to perceive these incidents as characterized by urgency, threats to core values, 
and uncertainty—in other words as crises that demand an effective response”. Indeed, each region has adopted 
state-level legislation and integrated state-government provisions into its own complex multi-level governance. 
Figure 4, below, presents the number of acts for two-level governance. All 17Autonomous Communities have 
legislated to manage the Covid-19 crisis, as well as central Government. Indeed, on 9 March, the Autonomous 
Community of Madrid 9 closed all schools and every order and decree in the region provides for the daily 
disinfection of public transport vehicles (Orden 338/2020); and on 12 March in Catalonia, the most active 
Autonomous Community in terms of regulatory production, as can be seen from Figure 3, the President of the 
Community, Quim Torra, issued the first decree-law to manage the pandemic from an economic point of view. 
Moreover, all the autonomous Presidents, except Quim Torra, signed a document for unity of action against 
Covid-19 after a videoconference with the Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez (Poggeschi 2020). 
 
Figure 6 - Number of acts adopted by single autonomous communities during the period March–May 2020 (1st and 2nd 
phases of Covid-19). 
 
 
Source: https://envira.es/es/normativa-publicada-relacion-covid-19-espana, elaboration of the author. 
 
 
24 In this regard, the Tribunal Constitutional asserts that Regional Statutes have to adopt the provisions in the Constitution in 
order to make Regional Government respect the limits set forth in art. 86.1 of CE. 
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These examples of decisions at the regional level precede the state of alarm declaration by five days and 
this is symptomatic of the decisional decentralization that characterizes the Spanish Regional State. The 
coordination between the central State and Autonomous Communities does not always seem direct and free 
from criticism.25 
The centralization of the major part of the decision-making process actuated with the state of alarm by the 
Executive collides with health management usually in the hands of Autonomous Communities, which have 17 
different regional health systems. Some sort of turnaround is noticeable on 3 May, when the Ministry of 
Healthcare issued an order that started the cogobernanza process (i.e. co-governance) with Autonomous 
Communities in the health area. However, from the executive, the appeals to Autonomous Communities are 
often centred on unity; while from the bottom (regional level), controversy mainly focused on the centralization 
of decision-making26, the delays in distributing medical materials in the first weeks of the emergency and the 
excessively harsh closure measures27. Moreover, the aforementioned Plan de desescalada constitutes another 
area of contrast between the centre and periphery, mainly because the Government decides on measures that 
the regional level must apply in practice, being the regional level, as in Italy, that is competent in the health 
area. The fact that these conflicts are not party-oriented, since the Presidents of Autonomous Communities 
agree with the Central Government or not regardless of their political colour, confirms the progressive loss of 





Concerning our main hypotheses, this article suggests that the pandemic crisis enhances the personalization 
of politics. Looking at our two empirical cases, we may argue that a personalization trend characterises both 
countries. Indeed, in both Italy and Spain, the regulatory and normative powers of presidents are, as Figures 1 
and 4 demonstrate, generally used in cases other than those of exceptionality and of an extraordinary nature 
contemplated by the Law and the Constitution (Heywood and Molina 2000). Thus, path-dependency guides 
these extraordinary situations so that in the Covid-19 crisis too, since it was unexpected, there emerged the 
deep and pre-existing political nature of systems (Capano 2020). Moreover, the evidence from Italy and Spain 
indicates that institutional personalization occurs at two levels of government: on the one hand, it can realize 
centralized power in which the Presidents play a central role; while on the other, it can shape the 
decentralization of power, in which regional and local politicians play a relevant role. These phenomena do 
not necessarily balance each other out, but they do imply a high level of personalization as a structural element 
of multi-level politics. 
 
25 See, among others, the two following articles. The first is “La gestión de las comunidades ante la crisis del coronavirus 
ganaapoyosfrente a los fiascos de Moncloa”: https://www.abc.es/sociedad/abci-gestion-comunidades-ante-crisis-coronavirus-
gana-apoyos-frente-fiascos-moncloa-202004240207_noticia.html?ref=https:%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F. The second is 
entitled “El debate en el Senado pone a prueba la coordinación y unidad entre Gobierno y autonomíasfrente a la covid-19”: 
https://www.publico.es/politica/emergencia-coronavirus-debate-senado-pone-prueba-coordinacion-unidad-gobierno-
autonomias-frente-covid-19.html 
26 See, for example, the conflict in Catalunya. Here are two articles on the (national) centralization of power during the 
pandemic: https://www.elnacional.cat/es/politica/parlament-recentralizacion-gobierno-coronavirus_519462_102.html and: 
https://www.eldiario.es/politica/comunidades-rebelan-sanidad-disparidad-desescalamiento_1_5872610.html 
27 The article “Sánchez insisteenhomogeneizar a las autonomías: “No tienesentidohacerdiferencias, el virus no entiende de 
fronteras” (by Juan Carlos Merino), published in La Vanguardia, is available here: 
https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20200329/48159227624/sanchez-homogeneizar-autonomias-diferencias-virus-
fronteras.html 
28 In the article “Las autonomíasrecelan de la desescalada del Gobierno”, published in La Vanguardia, the director Lola García 
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The analysis carried out in this article offers new empirical evidence about presidenzialization and 
demonstrates that Italy and Spain have different forms of pandemic management which clearly increase the 
role of the Executive at both the national and sub-national levels. Indeed, Covid-19 has considerably influenced 
the decision-making process, making it more top-down. We note an intense use of presidential decrees and 
decree-laws in Italy, and of ministerial orders and resolutions in Spain. This largely undermines the 
parliamentary form of government and involvement of the legislative body in the legislative process (Blanco 
Valdés 2007). Nevertheless, while in Italy the role of Prime Minister results in policy that is more relevant, 
taking into consideration his extensive use of presidential decrees and the fact that legislative activity consisted 
almost entirely of the adoption of decree-laws, in Spain the predominance of the President seems to be more 
limited by parties and ministers (see Figure 5 on the typology of Covid-19 acts in Spain). In Italy, Conte 
assumes a role divided between politician and outsider/technocrat (Pasquino and Valbruzzi 2012). Indeed, he 
is not a member of any party and is formally independent. While in Spain, Sánchez is the leader of PSOE as 
well as Prime Minister. Furthermore, both countries have a coalition government, but while in Italy the Prime 
Minister is not the expression of any party, in Spain the opposite is true. The fact that the Chief Executive is 
also a party leader does, on the one hand, support the thesis of personalization (more roles for one person); and 
on the other hand, it makes the President more dependent on the parties, thus mitigating his executive 
leadership (Poguntke 2005). However, both cases highlight a notable personalised trend, even if in different 
ways. In the Italian case, the personalization of politics and the leader’s growing importance occur at the 
expense of the parties. Conversely, in Spain, the personalization of politics is evident in the identification of 
the leader with his party29. Although both processes assume that the figure of the leader is progressively more 
important and that he occupies centre-stage in the political arena, thus shaping a leader-oriented political 
structure, the direct and main consequence of the decline of parties’ role as intermediate bodies is more evident 
in Italy than in Spain (McAllister 2007; Rahat and Sheafer 2007). Notwithstanding, the continuous plebiscitary 
appeal is noticeable in the speeches of Conte and Sánchez, underlining that coronavirus results in increasingly 
personal speeches by public leaders (see plebiscitarian linkage as a variant of electoral linkage in Barr 2009). 
Both Presidents have a personal and direct link with their citizens, both hold press conferences and make 
interventions on social networks, framing the crisis and making sense of it (Ansell, Boin, Keller 2010).  
At the regional level, in both countries, Presidents of the regions issue many orders and provisions, 
indicating a presidential regional system (Capano 2020, Kölling 2020). Nevertheless, from a territorial 
governance point of view, the decision-making process is very centripetal in both cases. And, especially, the 
Spanish “Estado autonómico” as a pattern of territorial system is challenged by the state of alarm provisions 
(Ruiz-Rico Ruiz 2020). If, on the one hand, the pandemic crisis has led Presidents of the Regions to adopt 
more binding and restrictive regulations (thus causing problems of understanding by citizens and businesses, 
lost and uncertain about their daily actions due to often conflicting provisions), on the other hand, it built a 
centralized system (Celotto 2020). In Italy this occurs at the executive level, thanks to a lack of legislative 
provision for an emergency; and at the presidential level, thanks to political fragmentation in the coalition 
government. Conversely, in Spain, the centralization in government is justified by the legislative provision for 
a state of exception and the relatively less centralization in the hands of the President of the government is due 
to the lower fragmentation of the governing coalition and the greater weight of the parties. Moreover, the 
emergence and significant normative and media activity of sub-national leaders confirm the thesis of the 
growing importance of personal politics, more so because this is replicated at several levels and in several 
arenas, highlighting a de facto personalization trend.  
It is too early to evaluate the effects of stabilization of presidential crisis management in the aftermath of 
the health and economic crisis, but for now we can at least assume that it is not just a possible trend. Rather, 
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personalization represents a dynamic that orders the contemporary political space. Covid-19 turned out to be 
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